Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Vincent Varisano Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at Dances With Bears


The Dutch auction, as it’s called in the wholesale flower trade of Europe, is a clever scheme which simulates competitive bidding while it hides premiums in the prices Dutch growers and traders rig for their flowers. To cut the cost of flowers you have to deadhead the Dutch. And that’s exactly what Russia is threatening to do this week.

The Dutch are crying foul. That’s what monopolists usually do when the game is up. In Dutch history going back to the time when the Amsterdam merchants held a monopoly on the world supply of nutmeg – a prophylactic against bubonic plague , it was believed at the time — they organized slavery, torture, and other atrocities to protect their nutmeg trading scheme. Before you jump to condemn the Russian phytosanitary authority for issuing a warning against Dutch flower exports, remember the Amboyna Massacre of March 9, 1623.*

Rosselkhnoznadzor (RSN), the state veterinary and phytosanitary agency in Moscow, has issued a request for the European Union (EU) to suspend its phytosanitary certification for the shipment of flowers from the Netherlands. Press reports describing this as an import ban are premature, RSN said yesterday. “The ban has not formally been introduced,” according to spokesman Yulia Melano. On the other hand, for practical purposes she concedes the ban has commenced. “We have only asked for consultation with our European colleagues. We have asked [them] to voluntarily and temporarily stop certification of this product for deliveries to the territory of Russia.” RSN has warned that if the EU will not do that, then RSN will formally introduce its own ban. RSN spokesman Alexei Alexeyenko said last week the talks with the EU phytosanitary officials had yet to start.

The Monday, July 27, announcement from RSN claims the reason for the import control request is that infestation has been discovered in more than half of test lots of cut flower imports from the Netherlands over the past three months. One of the culprits identified by RSN inspectors is the western flower thrip. Another is the even more notorious leafminer, Liriomyza trifolii, whom every gardener knows.

Along with Rospotrebnadzor (RPN), the consumer protection agency, the RSN’s chief Sergei Dankvert (below, left) has often been accused in the foreign press of pursuing a trade protection or political agenda, on behalf of the Kremlin. The former RPN chief , Gennady Onishchenko (right), was replaced in 2013 after allegations of excessive zeal, insufficient evidence. Their targets have included cucumbers from Spain, German cheese, Egyptian potatoes, American pork, Moldovan wine, and Australian kangaroo and lamb. For the backfile, documenting that the Russians are not alone in running such alleged trade protectionist schemes, see.

Unlike the foodstuffs, cut flowers have mostly been an import to Russia, though local farm enterprises and the Kaluga region joint venture with the Dutch, Rose Garden, are growing in volume and sales at better than 20% per annum. Until now, domestic market sales are estimated to be worth at least $1 billion yearly. According to this Russian market survey for 2012-2013, more than two-thirds of sales come from imports; up to 80% of imports come from Holland. Roses originate primarily from Ecuador; chrysanthemums and carnations from Colombia; orchids from Thailand.

After sharp growth in Dutch exports to Russia of cut flowers in 2012 and 2013 – as the table shows, Russia ranked 4th largest on the Dutch cut-flower trading table – there has been a sharp contraction.

TOP-10 DESTINATIONS FOR EXPORTS OF CUT FLOWERS FROM THE NETHERLANDS (in millions of Euros)

 

Source: http://ift.tt/1Ky4Qhj

By the end of March 2014 – that’s before the war against Russia had got under way at NATO headquarters – the Dutch export value for Russia, including bulbs and pot plants, was down 5% on the quarter; down 23% on the month. The sharpness of the decline was even greater if bulbs and potted plants are left out, and only cut flowers counted. The worm in the bud had started early in the year; the rot accelerated after the Dutch government followed Washington and London in blaming Moscow for the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 on July 17. Of the 298 crew and passengers killed, 192 were Dutch.

In 2012 FloraHolland (Koninklijke Coöperatieve Bloemenveiling, Royal Cooperative Flower Auction), the Dutch floriculture marketing organization, reported its total turnover of cut flowers, bulbs and pot plants at €4.28 billion, growing at just 3%. But growth in Russian sales was more than 40% that yearLast year, the Dutch exports to Russia had dropped substantially, and FloraHolland conceded there was “reason for concern.”

FloraHolland reports in its annual financial statements that on turnover of more than €4 billion – comprising more than 6 million lots, almost 13 million units – the market expenses run to about 9%; after-tax profit is 0.2%. For the accounts, click.

By October of 2014, analysts of the Dutch flower trade claimed the reasons for the trade reversal were the Ukraine conflict; the introduction of sanctions against Russia; and the devaluation of the rouble. This has been amplified by US Government outlets like Radio Liberty and Bloomberg. According to the radio this week, the proposed import ban “would aggravate tensions between the two countries already at odds over the downing of flight MH17”. The Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO) was more cautious, saying nothing about the export ban. But Bloomberg got the LTO spokesman, Maarten Leseman, to claim the phytosanitary violations announced by RSN in Moscow are “just an excuse for the Russian government to ban flowers. The real reason is political. The tribunal could be the real reason.”

He is referring to Dutch demands for a United Nations tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the MH17 crash. For the Dutch rush to judgement, read the backfile here. On July 16 President Vladimir Putin (left) warned Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (right), in a telephone call the latter initiated, that the Dutch and Americans were “leaking various overtly politicized versions of the events to the media”.

A closer look at the Russian cut flower trade reveals just as much disinformation. Here is an American business school study of how the Dutch work to rig the international flower market. “In a number of ways, the Dutch auction (pictured below) favors growers over buyers. First, the clocks move at high speeds, reducing buyer decision-making time and causing higher bid prices. Experiments have shown that higher speeds result in higher prices. Second, the service costs to buyers favors small lots over large lots. Thus no one party can purchase the entire lot without competition.”

The Aalsmeer flower market, world’s largest trading centre for cut flowers, near Schiphol airport, Amsterdam.

The scheme is already generating resistance among buyers, encouraging direct trade between the lowest-cost flower-producing countries and the high-value flower-consuming countries. According to the US study, “some large retailers like Marks and Spencer [UK] are bypassing the Dutch auctions and their commissions to source directly from growers in Spain and other countries.”

The Dutch acknowledge the result is a visible shift in import flows, and the elimination of the Dutch trade intermediaries. Here’s Rabo, the Dutch bank, admitting in January of this year, that African, Asian and South American countries are taking market share away from Holland:

Source: RaboBank: http://ift.tt/1Dn0aFl

FloraHolland admits “the Dutch share in global flower and plant production is decreasing. Growers increasingly sell their products without the direct intervention of FloraHolland and they operate further up the chain more often than before. The importance of the auction clock decreases as the use of electronic sales resources rises. It has to be said, however, that in 2014 this took place slower than expected.”

Source: RaboBank: http://ift.tt/1Ky4Qhs;

The map suggests there’s no obvious geographic reason why flower shipments shouldn’t go direct to Russian ports on the Black or Baltic Sea, and why the Russian flower trade shouldn’t move upstream, investing in flower cultivation, just as the Russian banana trade did in Ecuador several years ago. For the banana story, read this. Smuggling, other corruption and bankruptcy have put a sorry end to that tale.

For the start of Russia’s affair with Ecuadorian roses, start reading in 1998, when Russian flower entrepreneurs began using Miami as their transhipment point, avoiding Amsterdam. The high cost of air freighting flowers paid off on special occasions, like Women’s Day March 8. But on an all-year round basis, the profit margin for the importers was a modest 12%. This was also the result of the large number of importers and wholesalers in the Russian market, and the intensity of competition between them. In 1998, Business Bouquet, headed by Valery Stayen, estimated that the regular companies on the market numbered 20, importing 300,000 roses per week. For special flower days on the Russian calendar, the number of importers tripled.

Today, 17 years later, Stayen and Business Bouquet are still in business. But Stayen refuses to name the top-5 or top-10 companies in the trade. He won’t answer questions either about the scope for direct trade, avoiding the Dutch market, or the impact of the proposed ban.

Talia Akhmetova, head of the press service at Florist.ru, a leading Russian internet retailer, estimates that “about 90% of all flowers sold in the country are imported. About 60% of them are imports from the EU. They not only provide almost the entire volume of the Russian market, but also the range. Holland, Italy and France, the largest producers of flowers and plants, in Europe, have a huge territory with a first-class equipment, and in addition, a suitable climate for growing flowers. All this affects the quality of the flower, which has remained unchanged throughout the year. Among the flowers imported from the EU countries there are re-exports from Colombia, Kenya, Ecuador, Israel, Turkey and other countries, but the proportion is very small, about 10% to 20%. There are also direct deliveries from South America, but this amount is not systemically significant, except for roses.”

Asked whether the Russian market can reorient its imported supplies from the other countries, she said “it is more expensive to carry flowers directly from South America, Kenya, Ecuador, etc. into Russia because the volumes will be smaller than those flowing into and out of the Dutch auctions. The cost of logistics for transportation to Russia of relatively small volumes undoubtedly affects the purchase price.”

Asked to identify the top-5 Russian importers of cut flowers, and their market shares, Akhmetova said: “unfortunately, because of the opacity of the flower market, such data cannot be identified. Accurate estimation of the volume of imports is impossible because of illegal, gray market deliveries. That is, the flowers which have not passed through certification and control at [the Dutch] flower auctions, are transported across the Russian border without documents.”

Philip de Jong, the Dutch trade representative at his embassy in Moscow, is also mute. Asked to identify the principal Russian importers and traders of Dutch cut flowers, he refused, and referred instead to the Russian Agriculture
Ministry, which has yet to respond.

Reports on the domestic industry between 2012 and 2014 by Olga Ivanova identify the top-5 importers of cut flowers as Uraltorgservice, Impulse, Exim, Baltic Gift, and Impulse-Fruit. They reportedly account for no more than 31% of the import volume. The five leading wholesalers, according to earlier data for 2012, were Obi Logistics, CFC, Moneymaker, Agricultural Services, and Uraltorgservice. They account for no more than 40% of volume. In Moscow, Obi and CFC are in the top-5; also Flower Jet, Starlight, and Imdeko. They have a combined market share of 50%. According to Ivanova, Moscow city accounts for up to 23% of Russia’s flower sales, followed by St. Petersburg and Moscow region, with 13% and 18%, respectively.

Part of the reluctance of industry sources to identify the market leaders is that their market shares are relatively small; their names keep changing; and the gray trade is sizeable. Comparing the Dutch export numbers for Russia with the corresponding Russian import numbers for the Netherlands reveals that about $30 million worth of flowers have been crossing the Russian border which haven’t been registered at origin as Russia-bound exports. That’s about 10% of the Russian import total. Industry sources estimate the value of the gray market in imported flowers as larger than that. Dutch export sources say they have no idea of the value of the gray trade, and can’t account for the $30 million discrepancy in the trade figures.

Speaking today in Moscow, Vitaly Schmalz, head of the BPF group,a leading Moscow supplier of cut flowers, plants, and bulbs, said “the ban would deprive the Dutch budget regularly of multimillion profits in euros. Without a doubt it is an adequate response to the provocative sanctions against our country.” But he added that for the small businesses engaged in the horticulture trade the import ban would be a “fiasco”. “We need at least five to seven years — if there is such a favourable factor as cheap money – to recover to the current situation.” With just 10% of the market supplied by Russian flower-growers, Schmalz said import substitution would be impossible.

Speaking from Holland for the Dutch flower traders today, Leseman expressed the hope that the ban will not be introduced. “So far there is no official decision by the Russian side, or by the EU, to suspend certification and ban Dutch flower exports.”


*NOTE: the lead image is of The Tulip Folly, a painting of 1882 by the French artist, Jean-Léon Gérôme. He was depicting the scene in 1632 when speculation on the price of tulips created a bubble the Dutch market authorities tried to let down by ordering soldiers into the tulip fields to destroy the supply. A nobleman has drawn his sword to protect his investment in an unusual potted tulip. A decade earlier, the Dutch in the islands now known as Indonesia bribed local plantation owners, attacked British merchants, and put the Balinese into slavery to keep the supply of nutmeg to themselves. At Amboyna the Dutch governor trumped up treason charges against 17 Englishmen; waterboarded them into false confessions; and chopped their heads off. The murders became a cause for the first Anglo-Dutch war, which the British won in 1654. The Dutch were then obliged to pay compensation to the families of the victims. That came to £3,615. The nutmeg story can be read in full here.

 



via Vincent Varisano, Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Monday, July 27, 2015

Vincent Varisano Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Vincent Varisano,

I have recently returned from a week’s trip to Moscow and I will record briefly my necessarily anecdotal impressions of the economic situation.

Compared to the situation I saw in Moscow in February and March, there are clear signs of stabilisation.  

The worst of the inflation seems to be over. 

The all-too-evident beggars that were visible in February and March have disappeared. Whilst some of them may have been cleared away from the city by the police - something that undoubtedly happens in Moscow - previous experience suggests that this only has a limited effect and that in times of real hardship they quickly seep back. Their total disappearance suggests that the pressure of the inflation on people at the lower end of the income scale has abated.  

Summer is a quiet period in Moscow and one person told me that it seemed quieter than usual this year - which could suggest a continuing recession.  

However there were no obvious signs of stress on the high streets - eg. large numbers of closed or empty shops  - and none of the signs one associates with periods of severe crisis, such as I saw for example during recent visits to places like Athens and Helsinki or such as I remember from Moscow in the 1990s, eg. rowdy youths, uncollected street litter, aggressive graffiti etc. Moscow remains what it has now been for some time, a clean, orderly and graffiti free place.

I found the food shops full of produce. On the subject of the great cheese debate, Charles Bausman, the editor of Russia Insider and my generous host, offered me a range of Russian cheeses all of which were perfectly edible and some of which were excellent.

In one important respect economic activity continues at a scorching pace. Moscow is undergoing a massive make-over, with streets and sidewalks being repaired and repaved all over the city, parks laid out and improved, old buildings cleaned and restored, and new construction, especially in the suburbs, continuing at full tilt. To someone accustomed to the leisurely pace with which such things are done in Britain, the sheer pace and speed of work is exhilarating, even if it is sometimes inconvenient, with both sidewalks of a street for example being repaired at the same time, forcing pedestrians to walk with the traffic.

These of course are all anecdotal impressions. However they are consistent with the government’s latest economic projections, with the Economics Ministry now predicting a contraction of no more than 2.8% by year end, and more than 2% growth in 2016.

Is there anything that might delay or prevent this recovery? Oil prices have recently softened - a natural consequence of a glut - and they may soften further if as is now widely expected the US and British central banks raise interest rates in the next few months.  

As oil prices have softened the ruble has weakened. Unless however there is a total oil price collapse on the scale of last year’s, which few are now predicting, this is unlikely to have a significant impact.  

As Constantin Gurdgiev has pointed out there has been a steady improvement in Russia’s financial position with sovereign debt down from $57 billion last year to just $35 billion and aggregate foreign debt (both public and private) now standing at $560 billion as opposed to $730 billion a year ago. Meanwhile the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves have stabilised at $360 billion.

All this suggests a country that is methodically improving its position as it prepares itself for a period of growth. As I have written previously in light of the oil price collapse the recession is necessary to achieve a rebalancing, and that seems to be what is happening.

There is usually a lag between the picture shown by statistics and sentiment on the ground. Based on what I saw in Moscow and the government’s projections, the worst period of the recession has passed.

One important caveat must be made. As Russians constantly say, Moscow is not Russia and it may be that conditions outside Moscow are harsher.  

The point has force but can be exaggerated and Moscow is anyway so important to the Russian economy that good conditions there would tend to point to good conditions in other places.  

I am planning a trip to Perm in September, which should make it possible for me to compare the situation there.



via Vincent Varisano, Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Vincent Varisano Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at Asia Times


Since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the Russian media has been arguing that Russia would shift its energy exports away from Europe to the East, in particular to China.

 

There are plenty of reasons why Moscow is pushing this narrative. Over the past years, Russia’s dominant position in the European energy market has suffered several severe blows: new natural gas interconnectors, better storage facilities and new import terminals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) have made the Eastern half of the continent less dependent on Russian energy supplies.

At the same time, the EU has initiated antitrust cases against Gazprom, supported Ukraine through the ‘reverse flow’ of gas, and, after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, imposed sanctions.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that a frustrated Russia would be looking for less reticent customers elsewhere.

Alas, this ‘energy pivot’ is not likely to happen as advertised. While several major energy projects are currently being discussed between Russia and China, a closer look reveals that they will not constitute real alternatives but at best supplements to Russia’s European energy market.

For a number of reasons, Europe will remain Russia’s primary destination for energy exports, in particular natural gas.

China, Russia have great plans

The flagship project of the emerging energy cooperation between Russia-China, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, would provide China with 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas. Yet even if the project were to deliver 61 bcm, it still pales in comparison with 146 bcm that Gazprom exported to Europe in 2014.

Moreover, the gas fields that will feed the Power of Siberia pipeline are not located in Western but Eastern Siberia, thousands of kilometres away from the fields that feed the European gas pipelines. In other words, the Eastern gas fields are too remote to be commercially viable for exports to the European market in the first place.

Finally, China is not yet prepared to pay the gas price that some European countries are paying to Gazprom. In contrast to the Power of Siberia pipeline, the projected Altai pipeline to China would be fed by the Western Siberia fields, the same that provides gas to Europe. This project originated a decade ago but remained in limbo until it was surprisingly revived last year.

However, for several reasons, neither Russia nor China appears keen to actually start implementing the project.

First, the Altai pipeline would arrive from Russia at China’s largely deserted northwest, yet it is in the industrialized southeast where the gas is really needed. This would require China to build additional pipelines across the country.

Second, Russian gas in the eastern part of China competes with supplies from Turkmenistan, which have yet to reach their full potential. This Turkmenistan-option will allow China to negotiate a Russian price that would be lower than the European price level.

A third element of the Russian ‘energy pivot’ – Russian-Chinese cooperation on oil – should not raise much concern in Europe, since oil is a globally traded commodity.

Recent statements in the Russian media that Russia had become the largest supplier of oil to China, thus overtaking Saudi Arabia, are less spectacular than they may seem: they only mean that China is importing less oil from other suppliers, who will now compete for the European market.

Other elements of the emerging Russia-China energy relationship – cooperation on LNG and the exploration of Arctic energy resources – depend largely, and paradoxically, on Russia’s cooperation with Western industry.

The development of Russia’s LNG export capability remains heavily dependent on its access to Western technologies, and the same goes for the energy exploration in the Arctic.

Before China can be the beneficiary of Russian LNG exports and tap into Arctic oil and gas resources, Russia needs Western technologies and investment, which are currently to a large extent subject to EU-US sanctions.

Even if Russia were able to access the required technologies, neither oil nor LNG produced in the Arctic would be able by themselves to solidify the Russia-China energy relationship: Both commodities can be traded on the global market, and it appears unlikely that China would limit itself to buying the rather expensive energy extracted in the Arctic without considering alternative suppliers.

In sum, Russia’s ‘energy pivot’ to China should not cause European energy consumers sleepless nights. Due to a series of infrastructure projects, European countries have increasingly more alternatives to Russian gas and oil and thus enjoy a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia.

No matter how much this may frustrate Moscow, stable energy revenues from Europe remain of critical importance to the Russian state budget, particularly in the current low oil price environment.

Accordingly, Russia continues to make every effort to strengthen its energy influence in Europe, from seeking bilateral deals with European energy companies to intensive lobbying. A real ‘pivot’ looks different.

 



via Vincent Varisano, Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

Vincent Varisano Deutsche Bank on Russian 'Break-Even' Oil Prices

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at The True Economics


An interesting chart from Deutsche Bank Research putting break-even (fiscal budget) figures on oil prices for major oil producers:

image


Which puts the Russian break-even price at USD 105 per barrel.

The reality is somewhat different. Russia has the capacity to increase oil output further and has done so already (note that it is now world’s largest oil producer). It can also raise some other exports volumes, though general global conditions are not exactly supportive of this, and this underpins the revenue side of the budgetary balance somewhat.

Meanwhile, the Russian government’s own budgetary estimates put the break-even price of crude at around USD 80-85 per barrel, not USD 105 per barrel, which puts it closer to the UAE than to Oman.

Also, the Russian budget is listed in rubles, not USD. This means that the FX valuation of the Ruble to a basket of currencies (Russian exports are not all priced in USD) co-determines the break-even price. Moderating (albeit still very high) inflation and EUR trend, compared to USD trend, suggest a falling ‘fiscal break-even’ price of oil for Russia.

There are too many variables to attempt to estimate an effective and accurate ‘break-even’ price for oil for Russia.

What is clear however is that Russia’s current account (external balance) is in the black and is improving, not deteriorating. The latest balance of payments data show a current account surplus of almost USD 20 billion in 2Q15. The June 2015 y/y current account surplus is at 4% of GDP. The driver here is a decline in imports (down 40% in dollar terms in 2Q15 y/y) outpacing a drop in exports (down just under 30% y/y). In the first half of 2015 the trade surplus was USD 70 billion (USD 210 billion in exports, USD 140 billion in imports).

The balance of payments is also being supported on the upside by a decline in capital outflows. 2Q15 capital outflows amounted to ca USD 20 billion, predominantly comprising bank repayments of maturing foreign debt (which improves bank balance sheets and deleverages the economy). Moreover, direct investment from abroad into Russian non-fianncial corporations rose over 2Q15, resulting in an increase in foreign debt held by the non-financial sector.

Overall, the Russian Central Bank shows a foreign debt position at ca USD 560 billion (or 30% of GDP) at the end of 2Q15 - basically unchanged from 1Q15 and down from USD 730 billion at the end of 2Q14.

And another reminder to fiscalistas:
 

  • Russian public (government) external debt currently stands at USD35 billion. 
  • State-controlled banks hold USD 90 billion in external debt (total banking sector external debt is USD 150 billion and 60% of that is held by state-owned banks).
  • State-controlled NFC firms hold ca 40% of USD 360 billion foreign debt written against Russian NFCs (USD 144 billion). 
  • Accounting for cross-holdings and direct equity-linked debt, net foreign debt that has to be repaid at maturity or refinanced by NFCs and Banks owned by the Russian Government is probably around USD 150-160 billion. 


Sizeable, but less than 12% of GDP even after including the official public debt and state-owned enterprises debts.



via Vincent Varisano, Deutsche Bank on Russian 'Break-Even' Oil Prices

Friday, July 17, 2015

Vincent Varisano Russia Has Embraced the Weaker Ruble

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at Business New Europe


It is axiomatic that every major sporting event has a distinctive theme tune and every financial crisis has at least one unique descriptive slogan or buzzword. In Russia today the competition for that catchphrase is between “localisation” and “the new norm”.

A great deal has already been written about localisation, aka “import substitution”, but what exactly does “new norm” mean and how may it affect businesses and investment returns in the future? 

The one point we can be sure of is that it will not involve a return to the old macro or growth model. Between 2000 and 2012 the Russian growth model was founded on an almost unprecedented consumer boom, which was fuelled by $3 trillion of trickle down oil and gas tax revenues and the start of the credit industry.

That led to a dozen years of strong double-digit growth in the retail and other consumer sectors which, in turn, was the main driver of headline GDP growth.

That phase is now over and while the consumer and retail sectors are still capable of growing at rates above those of developed economies, the sector has matured relative to the end of the nineties and is no longer capable of driving strong headline growth alone.

Russia needs a new growth driver and that has to be based on a big and sustainable increase in investment spending.

This is something that President Putin acknowledged publicly for the first time in his annual Federal Assembly Address in December 2013.

Recall that growth in 2013 slipped to only 1.3%, from almost 4.5% two years earlier, and that despite oil averaging $110 per barrel and against a backdrop of global recovery. The message about the need for change could not have been clearer.

So, if we know that Russia cannot return to the old macro model, what new conditions can be created which will constitute the new norm?

It is fair to say that this is work in progress and while some revised policy priorities have become clear, there is still a lot more which is still unclear. Russia is at a crossroads and must decide on which road to take.

This is unlike the 2009 recession when it was okay to simply sit it out and wait for the oil price to recover. This is one of those times when it really is different.

Of course the Kremlin could make the conscious decision to try to pursue a muddle-through strategy, i.e. a sort of cross your fingers, hope for the best and keep telling people that it will be fine tomorrow. That’s a sort of Brezhnev option and would more likely lead to borderline stagnation and poor investment returns.

Eventually a long period of poor economic performance could create conditions for a colour revolution. It seems that many in the Kremlin are aware of this, and fear it, so that a do nothing option is most unlikely.

Those with a Russia phobia warn of a turn towards increased nationalism and isolationism, i.e. a sort of blame the West option as a possible distraction strategy.

There is zero evidence that this is a plausible option being considered.

On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence from the past 18 months which shows that despite the tough geopolitical rhetoric and threats, in the end the Kremlin has been careful not to push away Western companies and has been trying to limit the damage to longer-term recovery prospects. In any event a colour revolution would surely come much sooner down that particular road.

Instead the evidence suggests that Putin’s government is more interested in changing the model and creating conditions that can lead to a higher level of growth over the longer-term.

Certainly for now the priority is maintaining stability and riding out the financial storm and almost all of the resources available to the government are being set aside to ensure that remains the case.

Only when banks and industrial companies are again able to access international debt markets may we see a clear shift from planning and optimistic government rhetoric to specific actions.

180-degree change

But one part of the long-term recovery strategy has already been put into effect and that is the 180-degree change in the ruble policy. Ever since the 1998 default and ruble collapse the government has prioritised a strong and stable ruble policy.

There were several good reasons for that. The first being that the country was performing very nicely on the back of rising hydrocarbon wealth and had little need to create diversification or to boost such sectors as manufacturing.

Russia could afford to import what it needed and people were very happy to spend the strong ruble on foreign holidays.

The second reason was because of the legacy of the 1990s during which there were several currency and bank crises. To some extent the ruble had become the bellwether of overall wellbeing in the country and so long as the ruble was stable and the state banks expanding there was no reason to worry about much else.

The third reason, which was especially evident in 2008 and 2009, was because so many of Russia’s industrial companies and banks had borrowed so much in low interest bearing foreign currencies on the assumption that there was no exchange rate risk.

The 2008 oil price collapse forced the Central Bank to burn through around $200bn of its reserves to try to defend the ruble while Russian companies scrambled to convert their external loans into ruble debt. That situation has also changed completely and the risk mis-match is much less dangerous today.

Over the past six months the policy started to change. First there was no public panic when the ruble collapsed in December. For sure there were queues at ATMs but only to extract cash in order to buy durable goods that could have become scarce or more expensive in the months ahead. People no longer equated a ruble collapse with a broader economic threat in the same way they used to a decade or more earlier.

The key message that a weaker ruble is better than a strong ruble started to be better understood when the first quarter macro report showed a significant gain in some parts of domestic manufacturing as a result of the competitiveness boost from the ruble weakness in late 2014.

Suddenly people were looking for cheaper domestic alternatives. We also now hear government officials linking the more “competitive” currency with the import-substitution strategy. The same can be said for the plan to try to boost exports in sectors outside of extractive industries. “Competitive Russia” may also become one of those slogans to be associated with this crisis.  

The other epiphany we hear, and have seen in action, is the understanding that it actually matters much less where the oil price trades so long as the ruble is allowed to be flexible to compensate.

This is one of the reasons cited by the finance minister for his concern about the strong ruble recovery in the three months to early May. He can more easily balance the budget with a weaker or flexible ruble.

It is early days yet and we should not expect any major new initiatives from the government until there is more confidence about financial sector sanctions ending and, perhaps, until the election process is completed. But what we do know with certainty is that the economy has survived the crisis and will pull out of recession in Q4 this year or early in 2016.

But just surviving is not good enough beyond the short term and, thankfully, it seems those with the power to make changes seem to understand that.

There needs to be many changes in the years ahead, not least of which is the need to improve the business climate and boost competitiveness. But the shift in the ruble policy shows there is an underlying pragmatism. For businesses and investors looking past the current crisis that alone should offer a reason for optimism. 



via Vincent Varisano, Russia Has Embraced the Weaker Ruble

Vincent Varisano Russia Says No to GMO Seeds; Aims for Food Supply That's 'Cleanest in the World'

Vincent Varisano,

July 15 (NaturalNews) - The future of agriculture in Russia won’t involve genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), says the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. In order to preserve the quality and integrity of its food supply, Russia plans to stick with growing methods that protect the soil and boost yields naturally, a move that Dvorkovich says will make his country’s food among the “cleanest in the world.”

Russia does not import GMOs like most of Europe currently does, nor does it grow them. Unlike the U.S., Russia has deep concerns about the safety of GMOs and has chosen to implement an extended moratorium on their use as it looks to other, safer technologies that don’t come with the risk of birth defects, endocrine disruption and cancer.

At the recent International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Dvorkovich told listeners that Russia has “chosen a different path,” and that the country “will not use these [GM] technologies” to boost agricultural production. The announcement coincides with statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin back in 2014 about the need to “protect” Russian citizens against GMOs.

“We need to properly construct our work so that it is not contrary to our obligations under the WTO [World Trade Organization],” Putin stated.

“But even with this in mind, we nevertheless have legitimate methods and instruments to protect our own market, and above all citizens.”

Russian official: GMOs cause obesity and cancer and won’t be tolerated

This is the type of thing Americans should be demanding from their own elected leaders – an emphasis on protecting people rather than corporate profits – but, alas, the United States looks at GMOs much differently. Regardless of all the safety risks involved, America’s political puppets believe that GMOs should continue to dominate the national food market without even being labeled.

Meanwhile, Russia is leading the way in ridding its land of toxic poisons, stressing the need for agricultural policies that take a precautionary approach to controversial modalities like biotechnology that involve artificial gene splicing and toxic pesticides. The Vice President of Russia’s National Association for Genetic Safety, Irina Ermakova, had this to say recently about the issue:

“It has been proven that not only in Russia, but also in many other countries in the world, GMOs are dangerous.

Consumption and use of GMOs obtained in such way can lead to tumors, cancers and obesity among animals.”

Prime Minister: If Americans want GMOs, fine, but Russians prefer organic

Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev also made global headlines last year when he announced that Russia would no longer import any GMO products, boldly proclaiming that Russia has more than enough land and resources to produce organic food safely and cleanly without the need for corporate-owned, bio-pirated GMOs seeds and their corresponding growth chemicals.

He stated, as quoted by RT.com, “If the Americans like to eat GMO products, let them eat it then. We don’t need to do that; we have enough space and opportunities to produce organic food.”

With all this in mind, the American media’s “Russia is evil” ruse becomes increasingly less convincing.

Americans would be hard-pressed to ever have a politician stand up against GMOs like Russia’s leaders have, and yet they’re the “bad guys” and we’re the “good guys”?

Perhaps it’s time for more Americans to reevaluate who’s really calling the shots in the “land of the free” and what their motivation might be to vilify a country that has chosen to reject bio-piracy and uphold true, free-market agriculture in the interest of public health and national sovereignty.



via Vincent Varisano, Russia Says No to GMO Seeds; Aims for Food Supply That's 'Cleanest in the World'

Vincent Varisano Russia Mulls a Bid for Greek Railways and Thessaloniki Port in EU-Mandated Fire Sale

Vincent Varisano,

MOSCOW, July 13 (Sputnik) —The Russian side is ready to participate in the privatization of Greek enterprises, a range of Russian companies are willing to invest in industrial and infrastructure projects in Greece, a source in the Russian government told RIA Novosti Monday.

The source said that Russia’s largest railway company, Russian Railways, had stated earlier its interest in the acquisition of the three Greek assets — Thessaloniki ports, as well as the TrainOSE and ROSCO railway companies.

“A number of other Russian companies are also interested in investing in Greece, particularly in certain industrial and infrastructure facilities,” the source added.

 



via Vincent Varisano, Russia Mulls a Bid for Greek Railways and Thessaloniki Port in EU-Mandated Fire Sale