Friday, July 31, 2015

Vincent Varisano Turkish Stream Talks Reportedly Suspended, Delays Possible

Vincent Varisano,

SOFIA, July 31 (Novinite) - Russia and Turkey reportedly suspended negotiations on the construction of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline.

According to media reports, the negotiations were suspended after Russia failed to sign a key agreement on the discount of gas prices.

Back in February, Turkey obtained a 10.25 % discount on the 28-30 billion cubic meters of gas it purchases from Russia. However the final signature has been dragging for months, Hurriyet Daily informs.

Turkish officials added that another point of disagreement in the negotiations has been the insistence of Russia that Turkey should grant permits for the construction work on four planned lines in the project.

So far, Turkey has granted licences only for the first line. Gazprom, which is the Russian partner in the project, declined to comment. 

Earlier on Wednesday, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak hinted that the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey could be delayed if a a related intergovernmental agreement was not signed soon.

Turkish Stream, which was proposed as a substitute to the cancelled South Stream pipeline, is projected to supply natural gas from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea.

The planned annual capacity of the pipeline is 63 billion cubic metres, with Turkey to take about 14 billion cubic metres, while the rest will be exported to Europe.


SOFIA, July 30 (Novinite) - Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak has said construction of the so-called Turkish Stream gas pipeline might begin later than planned.

There is a risk not to start building the pipeline’s first section on schedule the intergovernmental agreement is not signed in time, Novak is quoted by RIA Novosti as saying.

Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller had earlier explained that part of Turkish stream might become operational by December 2016, and his deputy Alexander Medvedev had added in April that the fourth (and last) section of the pipeline will be up and running by 2020.

This comes just a day after reports from Energy Ministry sources who say Moscow had sent to Ankara a document offering only an agreement on the first line of Turkish Stream. Apparently Novak did not comment on the claims. 

Construction of Turkish Stream from the Russian side was officially announced in May, this being the first time Gazprom is embarking on implementing such a project without an intergovernmental agreement and other documents needed. Technically building the pipeline could begin either in June or July, Novak had pointed out last month.

Turkish Stream was announced last year as a substitute to South Stream, a project which was designed to carry gas to Europe via Bulgaria and other Eastern European states but which was ditched by Russia over Sofia’s reluctance to issue construction permits.



via Vincent Varisano, Turkish Stream Talks Reportedly Suspended, Delays Possible

Thursday, July 30, 2015

Vincent Varisano Turkish Stream Could Go Ahead at Partial Capacity

Vincent Varisano,

Russia is currently ready to sign only an agreement to build the first section of Turkish Stream, Russian news websites quote an Energy Ministry source as saying.

This comes after reports that Moscow has sent a draft intergovernmental agreement to Ankara on the construction of a pipeline set to replace the abandoned South Stream project.

Turkish Stream is envisaged to carry gas from Russia along the bed of the Black Sea, like South Stream, but with Turkey hosting the landfall instead of Bulgaria. It was announced in December 2014 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who then cited the Bulgaria’s reluctance to unblock construction permits for its own coastal area. 

The cabinet source quoted by Vedomosti says that Turkey and Russia’s heads of state have agreed on a phased implementation of Turkish Stream. 

This means the gas delivered to Turkey through the first section (around 16 billion cubic meters) will be for domestic use, while the infrastructure that will deliver volumes for EU members will be arranged in a separate text.

Turkish Stream will have a maximum capacity of about 63 bcm, or roughly the same as the planned capacity for South Stream.

Earlier, Russia repeatedly warned Europe should prepare for a shift in gas transportation from Ukraine to Turkey, adding it would only use the latter as a transit country from 2019. However, reports from the last few weeks suggest Moscow might be abandoning the idea.



via Vincent Varisano, Turkish Stream Could Go Ahead at Partial Capacity

Vincent Varisano China Stock Market Crash Will Hurt Commodity Exporters Like Russia

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at LewRockwell.com


By any measure, the Chinese equity markets are in turmoil. The Shanghai Index, up 150 percent in a year and down some 30 percent since mid-June, was hit hard again Monday, losing another 8.5 percent — its second-biggest fall in its history.

The selloff continues despite weeks of unprecedented market-rigging stimulus measures by the Chinese government. They include pumping in more than $200 billion to buy failing shares, restricting short selling and halting trading of nearly 50 percent of stocks on the Shanghai Composite. Although hundreds of stocks have resumed trading since the restrictions were implemented, 126 are still blocked from trading.

Not only are its equity markets shedding trillions in investor losses, Goldman Sachs estimates some $225 billion of capital has flowed out of China in the second quarter.

But the word on Wall Street is that China’s steep market decline is just a correction, it won’t affect its overall economy, it’s a non-event on the grand scale and worries it’s signaling a worldwide market meltdown are overblown.

It is extremely difficult to forecast China’s stock-market trends, considering the overt and unprecedented rigging by the Chinese government — whose stated goal is to stabilize and ultimately increase stock prices.

However, we can forecast with certainty the fears of a global market panic extending far beyond the strength or weakness of China’s equity markets.

As we wrote in last week’s Trend Alert, the world’s second largest economy, “China – in midst of an economic slowdown, an equity market calamity and trying to keep its real estate bubble from bursting – absorbs some 50 percent of copper, iron ore and coal exports. Thus, nations rich in commodity resources, such as Canada, Australia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Russia, Nigeria, Angola, Chile and Indonesia, are in recession or heading into one as demand for their exports declines worldwide.”

China Syndrome

It’s a fact. Commodity prices have crashed and a corresponding currency crisis are clear trend lines leading to more than just stock market mayhem; it portends global economic turmoil and social/geopolitical instability.

The Bloomberg Commodity Index has fallen to 2002 levels and, along with falling prices, so too have currencies of resource-rich nations that mine and export those commodities. For example, Canada’s loonie has plunged to 2004 levels against the US dollar. The Aussie dollar and Mexican peso are at six-year lows. Brazil’s real is at 12-year lows and Indonesia’s rupiah is trading at 1998 levels. Even oil-rich Norway’s krone, which is pegged to the euro, is down nearly 10 percent since May.

It’s a very simple formula: When the United States and Europe buy fewer consumer goods, China manufactures less of them. And the less China manufactures, the fewer raw materials and agriculture goods they import from resource rich nations. As exports decline from resource rich nations their economies grow weaker, their currencies fall lower and the risks for social unrest and global stock market turbulence increase.



via Vincent Varisano, China Stock Market Crash Will Hurt Commodity Exporters Like Russia

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Vincent Varisano Gazprom, Turkmenistan Locked in a Gas Dispute

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at OilPrice.com


Natural gas relationships are a bit like marriage. They are often long, expensive and ultimately very difficult to end. There could not be a better example than the energy relationship between Gazprom and Turkmenistan.

Although the country’s independence from the Soviet Union gave the newly-elected president, Saparmurad Niyazov, also known as Turkmenbashi (the Father of the Turkmens), exclusive control over the sixth largest natural gas reserves in the world, the government’s dependence on Russia to market Turkmen gas did not change. For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkmenistan was selling the majority of its gas output, to Russia, with Iran being the next notable customer. With a lack of other export infrastructure, Russia’s vast pipeline network was the only export outlet for Turkmenistan.

Gazprom has typically played the role of alternative gas supplier for countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose organization of former Soviet republics. Gazprom was the necessary middle-man purchasing the Turkmen gas low and selling it at a lucrative margin. The exports to Ukraine were able to instill powerful gas intermediaries in Kyiv, who negotiated with Turkmengaz via Gazprom officials, reaping huge profits from reselling the gas on domestic markets. Hence, Gazprom was relieved from the burden of being a supplier of last resort to the CIS countries and managed to maximize profit on its own gas by selling it at high oil-indexed prices on Western European markets.

This scheme operated successfully with Ukraine at least until 2009 when the global economic crisis depressed demand making the additional Turkmen gas simply unnecessary. Deliveries were halted for months due to technical reasons.

Finally, in 2010, the state-owned Turkmengaz company and Gazprom signed a long-term take-or-pay agreement for the supply of 10 bcm of gas per annum (four times lower volumes than pre-2009) at US $240 per 1000 cubic meters.

Last year, though, Gazprom decided it does not need to “take” anymore. Gazprom’s CEO promised that he would cut commercial ties with Turkmenistan. Then in the beginning of 2015, Gazprom said it would buy just 4 bcm of gas per year and would challenge the long-term contract in the Stockholm arbitration court in an attempt to revise the purchase prices.

The reason for the sharp move was that the drop in natural gas prices in 2014, due to their oil-indexation, made purchasing Turkmen gas and then reselling it abroad, simply too expensive. Thanks to shrinking demand in the EU, amid economic stagnation, and energy efficiency improvements, Gazprom is seeking ways to diversify its trading structure.

Unilaterally, in the first half of 2015, Gazprom has started paying Turkmenistan the average European price instead of the agreed fixed price leading to around US $400 million in losses for Turkmengaz, according to the Turkmen energy ministry. Even if Gazprom wins the case, it is difficult to see how Turkmenistan would agree to abide by the court’s ruling.

The government in Ashgabat could respond by fully redirecting its gas supply to China, which already buys more than half of all gas exports via the Central Asia – China pipeline, whose capacity of 55 bcm/y is currently only used at approximately 50 percent capacity. China has also eyed higher gas imports from Iran in an attempt to meet its exponentially rising gas demand.

China is also helping Turkmenistan develop the supergiant Galkynysh field, the second largest in the world. Estimated to hold up to 21 trillion cubic meters of gas, it could potentially turn Turkmenistan into the third largest gas producer in the world. Commercial gas production already started in the fall of 2013 and the expectation is that Turkmenistan could export up to 65 bcm of gas to China by 2020. This strategy makes sense considering current forecasts predicting natural gas consumption to reach 10 percent of total primary energy supply by 2020 up from 5 percent in 2012. This comes on the back of Beijing’s attempts to limit pollution and diminish its dependence on coal for power generation.

The other alternative for Turkmenistan – namely to ship its gas westward to Europe – still looks highly unlikely. Despite EU insistence that a pipeline through the Caspian Sea should be built to link the existing Southern Gas Corridor with the Turkmen reserves, the outstanding dispute over the Caspian legal status prevents any major infrastructure project that is not supported by the five littoral states. Russia, in particular, has been most vocal in opposing new energy infrastructure in the Caspian, allegedly on environmental grounds. In addition, Turkmenistan lacks sufficient pipeline infrastructure to transport the natural gas from the Galkynysh field in the East to the Caspian Sea in the West.

With demand uncertainty in Europe rising, funding a major gas export project would be a leap of faith at best. Russia has already started learning this lesson the hard way as it realizes the economic futility of building enormous pipelines that have purely political goals.



via Vincent Varisano, Gazprom, Turkmenistan Locked in a Gas Dispute

Vincent Varisano Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at Dances With Bears


The Dutch auction, as it’s called in the wholesale flower trade of Europe, is a clever scheme which simulates competitive bidding while it hides premiums in the prices Dutch growers and traders rig for their flowers. To cut the cost of flowers you have to deadhead the Dutch. And that’s exactly what Russia is threatening to do this week.

The Dutch are crying foul. That’s what monopolists usually do when the game is up. In Dutch history going back to the time when the Amsterdam merchants held a monopoly on the world supply of nutmeg – a prophylactic against bubonic plague , it was believed at the time — they organized slavery, torture, and other atrocities to protect their nutmeg trading scheme. Before you jump to condemn the Russian phytosanitary authority for issuing a warning against Dutch flower exports, remember the Amboyna Massacre of March 9, 1623.*

Rosselkhnoznadzor (RSN), the state veterinary and phytosanitary agency in Moscow, has issued a request for the European Union (EU) to suspend its phytosanitary certification for the shipment of flowers from the Netherlands. Press reports describing this as an import ban are premature, RSN said yesterday. “The ban has not formally been introduced,” according to spokesman Yulia Melano. On the other hand, for practical purposes she concedes the ban has commenced. “We have only asked for consultation with our European colleagues. We have asked [them] to voluntarily and temporarily stop certification of this product for deliveries to the territory of Russia.” RSN has warned that if the EU will not do that, then RSN will formally introduce its own ban. RSN spokesman Alexei Alexeyenko said last week the talks with the EU phytosanitary officials had yet to start.

The Monday, July 27, announcement from RSN claims the reason for the import control request is that infestation has been discovered in more than half of test lots of cut flower imports from the Netherlands over the past three months. One of the culprits identified by RSN inspectors is the western flower thrip. Another is the even more notorious leafminer, Liriomyza trifolii, whom every gardener knows.

Along with Rospotrebnadzor (RPN), the consumer protection agency, the RSN’s chief Sergei Dankvert (below, left) has often been accused in the foreign press of pursuing a trade protection or political agenda, on behalf of the Kremlin. The former RPN chief , Gennady Onishchenko (right), was replaced in 2013 after allegations of excessive zeal, insufficient evidence. Their targets have included cucumbers from Spain, German cheese, Egyptian potatoes, American pork, Moldovan wine, and Australian kangaroo and lamb. For the backfile, documenting that the Russians are not alone in running such alleged trade protectionist schemes, see.

Unlike the foodstuffs, cut flowers have mostly been an import to Russia, though local farm enterprises and the Kaluga region joint venture with the Dutch, Rose Garden, are growing in volume and sales at better than 20% per annum. Until now, domestic market sales are estimated to be worth at least $1 billion yearly. According to this Russian market survey for 2012-2013, more than two-thirds of sales come from imports; up to 80% of imports come from Holland. Roses originate primarily from Ecuador; chrysanthemums and carnations from Colombia; orchids from Thailand.

After sharp growth in Dutch exports to Russia of cut flowers in 2012 and 2013 – as the table shows, Russia ranked 4th largest on the Dutch cut-flower trading table – there has been a sharp contraction.

TOP-10 DESTINATIONS FOR EXPORTS OF CUT FLOWERS FROM THE NETHERLANDS (in millions of Euros)

 

Source: http://ift.tt/1Ky4Qhj

By the end of March 2014 – that’s before the war against Russia had got under way at NATO headquarters – the Dutch export value for Russia, including bulbs and pot plants, was down 5% on the quarter; down 23% on the month. The sharpness of the decline was even greater if bulbs and potted plants are left out, and only cut flowers counted. The worm in the bud had started early in the year; the rot accelerated after the Dutch government followed Washington and London in blaming Moscow for the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 on July 17. Of the 298 crew and passengers killed, 192 were Dutch.

In 2012 FloraHolland (Koninklijke Coöperatieve Bloemenveiling, Royal Cooperative Flower Auction), the Dutch floriculture marketing organization, reported its total turnover of cut flowers, bulbs and pot plants at €4.28 billion, growing at just 3%. But growth in Russian sales was more than 40% that year. Last year, the Dutch exports to Russia had dropped substantially, and FloraHolland conceded there was “reason for concern.”

FloraHolland reports in its annual financial statements that on turnover of more than €4 billion – comprising more than 6 million lots, almost 13 million units – the market expenses run to about 9%; after-tax profit is 0.2%. For the accounts, click.

By October of 2014, analysts of the Dutch flower trade claimed the reasons for the trade reversal were the Ukraine conflict; the introduction of sanctions against Russia; and the devaluation of the rouble. This has been amplified by US Government outlets like Radio Liberty and Bloomberg. According to the radio this week, the proposed import ban “would aggravate tensions between the two countries already at odds over the downing of flight MH17”. The Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO) was more cautious, saying nothing about the export ban. But Bloomberg got the LTO spokesman, Maarten Leseman, to claim the phytosanitary violations announced by RSN in Moscow are “just an excuse for the Russian government to ban flowers. The real reason is political. The tribunal could be the real reason.”

He is referring to Dutch demands for a United Nations tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the MH17 crash. For the Dutch rush to judgement, read the backfile here. On July 16 President Vladimir Putin (left) warned Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (right), in a telephone call the latter initiated, that the Dutch and Americans were “leaking various overtly politicized versions of the events to the media”.

A closer look at the Russian cut flower trade reveals just as much disinformation. Here is an American business school study of how the Dutch work to rig the international flower market. “In a number of ways, the Dutch auction (pictured below) favors growers over buyers. First, the clocks move at high speeds, reducing buyer decision-making time and causing higher bid prices. Experiments have shown that higher speeds result in higher prices. Second, the service costs to buyers favors small lots over large lots. Thus no one party can purchase the entire lot without competition.”

The Aalsmeer flower market, world’s largest trading centre for cut flowers, near Schiphol airport, Amsterdam.

The scheme is already generating resistance among buyers, encouraging direct trade between the lowest-cost flower-producing countries and the high-value flower-consuming countries. According to the US study, “some large retailers like Marks and Spencer [UK] are bypassing the Dutch auctions and their commissions to source directly from growers in Spain and other countries.”

The Dutch acknowledge the result is a visible shift in import flows, and the elimination of the Dutch trade intermediaries. Here’s Rabo, the Dutch bank, admitting in January of this year, that African, Asian and South American countries are taking market share away from Holland:

Source: RaboBank: http://ift.tt/1Dn0aFl

FloraHolland admits “the Dutch share in global flower and plant production is decreasing. Growers increasingly sell their products without the direct intervention of FloraHolland and they operate further up the chain more often than before. The importance of the auction clock decreases as the use of electronic sales resources rises. It has to be said, however, that in 2014 this took place slower than expected.”

Source: RaboBank: http://ift.tt/1Ky4Qhs;

The map suggests there’s no obvious geographic reason why flower shipments shouldn’t go direct to Russian ports on the Black or Baltic Sea, and why the Russian flower trade shouldn’t move upstream, investing in flower cultivation, just as the Russian banana trade did in Ecuador several years ago. For the banana story, read this. Smuggling, other corruption and bankruptcy have put a sorry end to that tale.

For the start of Russia’s affair with Ecuadorian roses, start reading in 1998, when Russian flower entrepreneurs began using Miami as their transhipment point, avoiding Amsterdam. The high cost of air freighting flowers paid off on special occasions, like Women’s Day March 8. But on an all-year round basis, the profit margin for the importers was a modest 12%. This was also the result of the large number of importers and wholesalers in the Russian market, and the intensity of competition between them. In 1998, Business Bouquet, headed by Valery Stayen, estimated that the regular companies on the market numbered 20, importing 300,000 roses per week. For special flower days on the Russian calendar, the number of importers tripled.

Today, 17 years later, Stayen and Business Bouquet are still in business. But Stayen refuses to name the top-5 or top-10 companies in the trade. He won’t answer questions either about the scope for direct trade, avoiding the Dutch market, or the impact of the proposed ban.

Talia Akhmetova, head of the press service at Florist.ru, a leading Russian internet retailer, estimates that “about 90% of all flowers sold in the country are imported. About 60% of them are imports from the EU. They not only provide almost the entire volume of the Russian market, but also the range. Holland, Italy and France, the largest producers of flowers and plants, in Europe, have a huge territory with a first-class equipment, and in addition, a suitable climate for growing flowers. All this affects the quality of the flower, which has remained unchanged throughout the year. Among the flowers imported from the EU countries there are re-exports from Colombia, Kenya, Ecuador, Israel, Turkey and other countries, but the proportion is very small, about 10% to 20%. There are also direct deliveries from South America, but this amount is not systemically significant, except for roses.”

Asked whether the Russian market can reorient its imported supplies from the other countries, she said “it is more expensive to carry flowers directly from South America, Kenya, Ecuador, etc. into Russia because the volumes will be smaller than those flowing into and out of the Dutch auctions. The cost of logistics for transportation to Russia of relatively small volumes undoubtedly affects the purchase price.”

Asked to identify the top-5 Russian importers of cut flowers, and their market shares, Akhmetova said: “unfortunately, because of the opacity of the flower market, such data cannot be identified. Accurate estimation of the volume of imports is impossible because of illegal, gray market deliveries. That is, the flowers which have not passed through certification and control at [the Dutch] flower auctions, are transported across the Russian border without documents.”

Philip de Jong, the Dutch trade representative at his embassy in Moscow, is also mute. Asked to identify the principal Russian importers and traders of Dutch cut flowers, he refused, and referred instead to the Russian Agriculture
Ministry, which has yet to respond.

Reports on the domestic industry between 2012 and 2014 by Olga Ivanova identify the top-5 importers of cut flowers as Uraltorgservice, Impulse, Exim, Baltic Gift, and Impulse-Fruit. They reportedly account for no more than 31% of the import volume. The five leading wholesalers, according to earlier data for 2012, were Obi Logistics, CFC, Moneymaker, Agricultural Services, and Uraltorgservice. They account for no more than 40% of volume. In Moscow, Obi and CFC are in the top-5; also Flower Jet, Starlight, and Imdeko. They have a combined market share of 50%. According to Ivanova, Moscow city accounts for up to 23% of Russia’s flower sales, followed by St. Petersburg and Moscow region, with 13% and 18%, respectively.

Part of the reluctance of industry sources to identify the market leaders is that their market shares are relatively small; their names keep changing; and the gray trade is sizeable. Comparing the Dutch export numbers for Russia with the corresponding Russian import numbers for the Netherlands reveals that about $30 million worth of flowers have been crossing the Russian border which haven’t been registered at origin as Russia-bound exports. That’s about 10% of the Russian import total. Industry sources estimate the value of the gray market in imported flowers as larger than that. Dutch export sources say they have no idea of the value of the gray trade, and can’t account for the $30 million discrepancy in the trade figures.

Speaking today in Moscow, Vitaly Schmalz, head of the BPF group,a leading Moscow supplier of cut flowers, plants, and bulbs, said “the ban would deprive the Dutch budget regularly of multimillion profits in euros. Without a doubt it is an adequate response to the provocative sanctions against our country.” But he added that for the small businesses engaged in the horticulture trade the import ban would be a “fiasco”. “We need at least five to seven years — if there is such a favourable factor as cheap money – to recover to the current situation.” With just 10% of the market supplied by Russian flower-growers, Schmalz said import substitution would be impossible.

Speaking from Holland for the Dutch flower traders today, Leseman expressed the hope that the ban will not be introduced. “So far there is no official decision by the Russian side, or by the EU, to suspend certification and ban Dutch flower exports.”


*NOTE: the lead image is of The Tulip Folly, a painting of 1882 by the French artist, Jean-Léon Gérôme. He was depicting the scene in 1632 when speculation on the price of tulips created a bubble the Dutch market authorities tried to let down by ordering soldiers into the tulip fields to destroy the supply. A nobleman has drawn his sword to protect his investment in an unusual potted tulip. A decade earlier, the Dutch in the islands now known as Indonesia bribed local plantation owners, attacked British merchants, and put the Balinese into slavery to keep the supply of nutmeg to themselves. At Amboyna the Dutch governor trumped up treason charges against 17 Englishmen; waterboarded them into false confessions; and chopped their heads off. The murders became a cause for the first Anglo-Dutch war, which the British won in 1654. The Dutch were then obliged to pay compensation to the families of the victims. That came to £3,615. The nutmeg story can be read in full here.

 



via Vincent Varisano, Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Monday, July 27, 2015

Vincent Varisano Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Vincent Varisano,

I have recently returned from a week’s trip to Moscow and I will record briefly my necessarily anecdotal impressions of the economic situation.

Compared to the situation I saw in Moscow in February and March, there are clear signs of stabilisation.  

The worst of the inflation seems to be over. 

The all-too-evident beggars that were visible in February and March have disappeared. Whilst some of them may have been cleared away from the city by the police - something that undoubtedly happens in Moscow - previous experience suggests that this only has a limited effect and that in times of real hardship they quickly seep back. Their total disappearance suggests that the pressure of the inflation on people at the lower end of the income scale has abated.  

Summer is a quiet period in Moscow and one person told me that it seemed quieter than usual this year - which could suggest a continuing recession.  

However there were no obvious signs of stress on the high streets - eg. large numbers of closed or empty shops  - and none of the signs one associates with periods of severe crisis, such as I saw for example during recent visits to places like Athens and Helsinki or such as I remember from Moscow in the 1990s, eg. rowdy youths, uncollected street litter, aggressive graffiti etc. Moscow remains what it has now been for some time, a clean, orderly and graffiti free place.

I found the food shops full of produce. On the subject of the great cheese debate, Charles Bausman, the editor of Russia Insider and my generous host, offered me a range of Russian cheeses all of which were perfectly edible and some of which were excellent.

In one important respect economic activity continues at a scorching pace. Moscow is undergoing a massive make-over, with streets and sidewalks being repaired and repaved all over the city, parks laid out and improved, old buildings cleaned and restored, and new construction, especially in the suburbs, continuing at full tilt. To someone accustomed to the leisurely pace with which such things are done in Britain, the sheer pace and speed of work is exhilarating, even if it is sometimes inconvenient, with both sidewalks of a street for example being repaired at the same time, forcing pedestrians to walk with the traffic.

These of course are all anecdotal impressions. However they are consistent with the government’s latest economic projections, with the Economics Ministry now predicting a contraction of no more than 2.8% by year end, and more than 2% growth in 2016.

Is there anything that might delay or prevent this recovery? Oil prices have recently softened - a natural consequence of a glut - and they may soften further if as is now widely expected the US and British central banks raise interest rates in the next few months.  

As oil prices have softened the ruble has weakened. Unless however there is a total oil price collapse on the scale of last year’s, which few are now predicting, this is unlikely to have a significant impact.  

As Constantin Gurdgiev has pointed out there has been a steady improvement in Russia’s financial position with sovereign debt down from $57 billion last year to just $35 billion and aggregate foreign debt (both public and private) now standing at $560 billion as opposed to $730 billion a year ago. Meanwhile the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves have stabilised at $360 billion.

All this suggests a country that is methodically improving its position as it prepares itself for a period of growth. As I have written previously in light of the oil price collapse the recession is necessary to achieve a rebalancing, and that seems to be what is happening.

There is usually a lag between the picture shown by statistics and sentiment on the ground. Based on what I saw in Moscow and the government’s projections, the worst period of the recession has passed.

One important caveat must be made. As Russians constantly say, Moscow is not Russia and it may be that conditions outside Moscow are harsher.  

The point has force but can be exaggerated and Moscow is anyway so important to the Russian economy that good conditions there would tend to point to good conditions in other places.  

I am planning a trip to Perm in September, which should make it possible for me to compare the situation there.



via Vincent Varisano, Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Vincent Varisano Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market

Vincent Varisano,

This article originally appeared at Asia Times


Since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the Russian media has been arguing that Russia would shift its energy exports away from Europe to the East, in particular to China.

 

There are plenty of reasons why Moscow is pushing this narrative. Over the past years, Russia’s dominant position in the European energy market has suffered several severe blows: new natural gas interconnectors, better storage facilities and new import terminals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) have made the Eastern half of the continent less dependent on Russian energy supplies.

At the same time, the EU has initiated antitrust cases against Gazprom, supported Ukraine through the ‘reverse flow’ of gas, and, after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, imposed sanctions.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that a frustrated Russia would be looking for less reticent customers elsewhere.

Alas, this ‘energy pivot’ is not likely to happen as advertised. While several major energy projects are currently being discussed between Russia and China, a closer look reveals that they will not constitute real alternatives but at best supplements to Russia’s European energy market.

For a number of reasons, Europe will remain Russia’s primary destination for energy exports, in particular natural gas.

China, Russia have great plans

The flagship project of the emerging energy cooperation between Russia-China, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, would provide China with 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas. Yet even if the project were to deliver 61 bcm, it still pales in comparison with 146 bcm that Gazprom exported to Europe in 2014.

Moreover, the gas fields that will feed the Power of Siberia pipeline are not located in Western but Eastern Siberia, thousands of kilometres away from the fields that feed the European gas pipelines. In other words, the Eastern gas fields are too remote to be commercially viable for exports to the European market in the first place.

Finally, China is not yet prepared to pay the gas price that some European countries are paying to Gazprom. In contrast to the Power of Siberia pipeline, the projected Altai pipeline to China would be fed by the Western Siberia fields, the same that provides gas to Europe. This project originated a decade ago but remained in limbo until it was surprisingly revived last year.

However, for several reasons, neither Russia nor China appears keen to actually start implementing the project.

First, the Altai pipeline would arrive from Russia at China’s largely deserted northwest, yet it is in the industrialized southeast where the gas is really needed. This would require China to build additional pipelines across the country.

Second, Russian gas in the eastern part of China competes with supplies from Turkmenistan, which have yet to reach their full potential. This Turkmenistan-option will allow China to negotiate a Russian price that would be lower than the European price level.

A third element of the Russian ‘energy pivot’ – Russian-Chinese cooperation on oil – should not raise much concern in Europe, since oil is a globally traded commodity.

Recent statements in the Russian media that Russia had become the largest supplier of oil to China, thus overtaking Saudi Arabia, are less spectacular than they may seem: they only mean that China is importing less oil from other suppliers, who will now compete for the European market.

Other elements of the emerging Russia-China energy relationship – cooperation on LNG and the exploration of Arctic energy resources – depend largely, and paradoxically, on Russia’s cooperation with Western industry.

The development of Russia’s LNG export capability remains heavily dependent on its access to Western technologies, and the same goes for the energy exploration in the Arctic.

Before China can be the beneficiary of Russian LNG exports and tap into Arctic oil and gas resources, Russia needs Western technologies and investment, which are currently to a large extent subject to EU-US sanctions.

Even if Russia were able to access the required technologies, neither oil nor LNG produced in the Arctic would be able by themselves to solidify the Russia-China energy relationship: Both commodities can be traded on the global market, and it appears unlikely that China would limit itself to buying the rather expensive energy extracted in the Arctic without considering alternative suppliers.

In sum, Russia’s ‘energy pivot’ to China should not cause European energy consumers sleepless nights. Due to a series of infrastructure projects, European countries have increasingly more alternatives to Russian gas and oil and thus enjoy a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia.

No matter how much this may frustrate Moscow, stable energy revenues from Europe remain of critical importance to the Russian state budget, particularly in the current low oil price environment.

Accordingly, Russia continues to make every effort to strengthen its energy influence in Europe, from seeking bilateral deals with European energy companies to intensive lobbying. A real ‘pivot’ looks different.

 



via Vincent Varisano, Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market